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Among the current continuous variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) schemes, only the
Gaussian-modulated reverse reconciliation (RR) scheme has the potential to provide high secret key rates
for long distance transmission. How to guarantee the security of non-Gaussian-modulated CVQKD is
crucial to many practical applications. In the following, we present a generalized RRCVQKD scheme,
through which arbitrary modulation can be used to establish quantum keys. To overcome the key problem
of Eve’s introduced noise and give a general analysis of the system, we introduce a noise estimate and
employ both the functional variational calculus and Markov analysis methods.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.-p, 89.70.+c
Continuous variable quantum key distribution
(CVQKD) is expected to provide high secret key
rates. However, up to now, only Gaussian-modulated
reverse reconciliation (RR) has been analyzed [2, 3, 4].
There is also a discrete-modulation scheme [1], but its
secret key rate sharply decreases with the increase of line
loss [1]. Since Gaussian modulation is difficult to realize
in practice, whether non-Gaussian-modulated schemes
can be secure and have the potential to provide high key
rate is of great importance to many practical applications.
Moreover, for the Gaussian-modulated scheme, it has been
proved that the Gaussian attack is optimal [2], while for
arbitrary modulation, how to prevent Eve from introducing
various noises is still an open problem.
In the following we will present a generalized
RRCVQKD scheme, through which arbitrary modulation
can be employed to establish the key. We show that,
through the conditional entropy and noise estimate, Eve’s
attack on Bob’s information can be restrained only to the
Markov attack if there is no excess noise [3] or the excess
noise only allows Eve to obtain limited additional informa-
tion. To give the optimized noise of Eve’s attack under ar-
bitrary modulations, we investigate a functional variational
calculus method, through which the same result as the pre-
vious one under Gaussian modulation can be obtained. Fi-
nally, as a special example, we give the same secret key
rate as the existing one for the Gaussian-modulated scheme
via this new general protocol. To compare with the exist-
ing binary-modulated post-selection schemes [1], we also
show the potential of a corresponding reverse reconcilia-
tion scheme whose secret key rate can reach 41% of that of
the Gaussian-modulated scheme.
The protocol of generalized CVQKD runs as follows:
Alice randomly chooses α = xA + ipA from a certain
distribution, such as a Gaussian, average or binary distribu-
tion, and sends coherent state |α〉 to Bob, where xA and pA
denote two conjugate quadratures of the electromagnetic
field. Bob randomly chooses quadrature x or p to measure.
After many such communications, Alice and Bob share a
set of correlated variables. Then Alice and Bob randomly
make public some of their variables to estimate the condi-
tional entropy H(B|A) and the noise distribution P (B|A)
for both quadratures as well as the maximum information
tapped by Eve, where A and B respectively describe Alice
and Bob’s variables. If estimates show that H(B|A) and
P (B|A) of both quadratures are below a certain threshold,
then Bob informs Alice which quadrature he has chosen
to measure for each variable through a classical authentic
channel. Later, Alice and Bob sift their data by discarding
uncorrelated variables. Set γ to describe the ratio of the re-
mained variables. After that, they share a new set of corre-
lated data, which are called ‘key elements’ in the following.
Then, through the reverse reconciliation protocol [6, 7] and
privacy amplification [8], they can distill their final secret
keys. In this scheme, Alice and Bob must make sure that
they can estimate H(B|A) and P (B|A) for both quadra-
tures accurately and that the estimate cannot be controlled
by Eve. In the following, we will discuss the security of
this scheme.
Under the condition of no excess noise: The coherent
state is the minimum uncertainty state, and any eavesdrop-
per cannot prepare another state where the noise in both
quadratures is smaller than that of the coherent state. If
there is no ‘excess noise’ between Alice and Bob, then for
the coherent state we have: H(xB|xA) + H(pB|pA) =
2H0, where H(·|·) describes the conditional entropy, xB
and pB describe Bob’s measured result of two quadra-
tures, and H0 denotes the entropy of a quadrature of the
vacuum state [2, 6, 9]. If the state Alice sends is |α〉,
the state that Bob receives will be |Gα〉, where G is the
channel transmission. For convenience, in the following
we will use a and b, respectively, to denote Alice and
Bob’s variables of one quadrature without distinguishing
x or p, and e that of Eve’s arbitrary ancilla. For the co-







where N0 denotes the variance of the vacuum noise [1,
6]. Because of the uncertainty theory, for any eaves-
dropping we have: H(xB|xE) + H(pB |pA) ≥ 2H0,
H(xB|xE) + H(pB|pE) ≥ 2H0, VxB|xEVpB |pA ≥ N 20 ,
and VxB|xEVpB |pE ≥ N 20 , where xE and pE denote Eve’s
2tapped results and V·|· denotes the conditional variance
[2, 3, 9]. The coherent state makes the conditional en-
tropy and the channel noise of both quadratures saturate
the quantum limitation, which cannot be reduced by Eve,
and Eve cannot control Alice and Bob’s estimate of the
conditional entropy and noise, such that her attack should
not disturb the distribution of the noise, which means that
Eve should maintain: H(B|A,E) = H(B|A) = H0 and
P (b|a, e) = P (b|a).
In the reverse reconciliation scheme, after the data
sifting, the secret key rate is given by: △I =
γ[minH(B|E)−H(B|A)]. Then we obtain:
△I = inf I(A : B|E) · γ
and consequently H(B,E|A) = H(E|A) + H(B|A)
where I denotes the mutual information after the data sift-
ing. From P (b|a, e) = P (b|a) we can obtain: P (e|b) =∫
P (e, a|b)da = ∫ P (e|a)P (a|b)da and P (b|e) =∫
P (b|a)P (a|e)da. Then it can be shown that if there
is no excess noise, Eve’s estimate of Bob’s variables is
based on her estimate of Alice’s variables and thus on a
Markov chain of Eve → Alice → Bob, which means
that if Alice’s variables are known, Eve and Bob’s variables
are uncorrelated. In the reverse reconciliation scheme, al-
though the quantum state is sent by Alice to Bob, it is Al-
ice who guesses what Bob has received, rather than Bob
who guesses what Alice has sent, so even if Eve can obtain
much more information than Bob from Alice under high
loss condition, to estimate what Bob has received she will
always be at a disadvantage compared with Alice. This
Markov chain guarantees I(E : B) ≤ I(A : B) [10].
In this scheme, since the conditional noise distribution
will be estimated accurately, the channel between Alice
and Bob can be maintained Gaussian, but that between Eve
and Alice may be varied. Whereas, no matter how Eve
attacks, the maximum total information she and Bob can
learn from Alice is below the Holevo bound, χ(ρA), where
ρA is Alice’s sent state, so we have I(B,E : A) ≤ χ(ρA).
Then, because of the Markov chain of Eve → Alice →
Bob, the mutual information between them should satisfy
I(A : B) + I(A : E)− I(B : E) ≤ χ(ρA). The channel
property between Alice and Bob can be known through the
noise estimate, and the Markov chain guarantees that the
noises of Eve’s and Bob’s estimates of Alice’s quadrature
are uncorrelated, so in principle Eve’s maximum informa-
tion obtained from Alice and consequently from Bob can
be calculated.
For a given I(A : E),
∫
P (e)H(A|e)de = H(A|E)
can be regarded as constant, but P (e) may be controlled
by Eve. To obtain as much information from Bob as
possible, Eve should minimize the conditional entropy
H(B|E) = ∫ P (e)H(B|e)de. The channel between
Alice and Bob and Alice’s modulation cannot be con-
trolled by Eve, so the only option left to Eve is to op-
timize the channel between her and Alice. Since Alice’s
modulation is determined, Eve’s optimization of her chan-
nel is equivalent to finding the best P (e). The mini-
mum value of H(B|E) can be obtained at the extreme
point of the functional H(B|E) = ∫ P (e)H(B|e)de un-
der the condition of
∫
P (e)H(A|e)de = H(A|E) and∫
P (e)de = 1. Then the extreme point should be that of
the functionalH(B|E) = ∫ P (e)[H(B|e)−λH(A|e)−
µ]de + λH(A|E) + µ, where λ and µ are introduced
parameters. Through calculating the functional variation
δH(B|E)
δP (e)





]P (e) = 0, the solution of which is
H(B|e)− λH(A|e)− µ = CP (e), where C is an unde-
termined coefficient. Since H(·|·) is the entropy function,
it can be seen that the extreme point is the P0(e) which
makes H(B|e) = H(B|E) and H(A|e) = H(A|E).
Further calculation shows that this point is a minimum
value point.
We now introduce HMax, and set HMax = χ(ρA) −
I(A : B) − H(A) + H(B). Then, the Holevo bound
requires
∫
P (e)[H(B|e) − H(A|e)]de ≤ HMax. Under
the restriction of this bound, both H(A|E) and H(B|E)
can be minimized still only when H(B|e) = H(B|E)
and H(A|e) = H(A|E). Therefore, the secret key rate




H(B|e) = H(B|E) and H(A|e) = H(A|E).
Gaussian modulation [3]: In the above protocol, Alice
chooses xA and pA from a Gaussian distribution of zero
mean and variance VAN0. Then, the distribution of a can





For Gaussian modulation, the way for Eve to guaran-
tee H(B|e) = H(B|E) and H(A|e) = H(A|E) is to
maintain the channel between her and Alice to be Gaus-
sian, which means the Gaussian attack is optimal. For the
Gaussian channel, we can suppose Eve’s estimate satisfies






], where β and NE



















, and β′ is an introduced parameter.
Consequently, the variance of Eve’s estimate of Bob’s
quadrature becomes Vb|e = GN ′E + N0. The con-
ditional entropy between them is given by H(B|e) =
0.5 log2 Vb|e + τ , H(A|e) = 0.5 log2 N ′E + τ , where τ
is a constant [10]. Also we have χ(ρA) = 0.5 log2 V ,
H(A) = 0.5 log2 VAN0 + τ , H(B) = 0.5 log2(GVA +
1)N0 + τ and I(A : B) = 0.5 log2(GVA + 1), where
V = VA+1. Then throughH(B|E)−H(A|E) ≤ HMax,
we have N ′E = VAN0VA−GVA+1 and consequently NE =
N0
1−G ,
which means the minimum noise added on Eve’s side is
NE − N0 = GN01−G , just the same as that given by Ref.
3[4, 11]. Finally, the secret key rate becomes











which is exactly the same as the result given by Grosshans
et al [3].
Binary modulation: In the above scheme, suppose Alice
randomly chooses one state from |c〉, |−c〉, |ic〉 and |−ic〉,
where c is a constant, and sends it to Bob.
For this modulation, the channel between Alice and Bob
is the binary Gaussian channel. Because of the intrinsic
quantum noise, |〈c| − c〉|2 6= 0 and |〈c| − ic〉|2 6= 0, ex-
cept for Alice no one can be sure which state Alice has sent
even after Alice exposes which quadrature she has chosen.
Then, for the Markov chain, Eve will always be at a disad-
vantage to estimate Bob’s quadrature. Alice and Bob will
expose their measured quadrature, so Alice’s sent state can
be equivalent to ρA = 0.5|c〉〈c|+0.5|−c〉〈−c|. Then Eve
can regard Alice’s state as binary digit 0 or 1 and Eve’s un-
certainty of Alice’s state can be described by the quantum
bit error rate (QBER), qEA. Here we can see that the way to
keep H(B|e) = H(B|E) and H(A|e) = H(A|E) is to
set Eve’s QBER to be independent of her estimated results.
Then χ(ρA) = χ(0.5|c〉〈c|+0.5| − c〉〈−c|), H(A) = 1,
H(A|e) = Γ(qEA), H(B|e) = Θ[qEAP (b|a = c) +
(1 − qEA)P (b|a = −c)], H(B) = Θ[0.5P (b|a =
c) + 0.5P (b|a = −c)] and H(B|A) = H0, where
Γ(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the Shan-
non entropy and Θ[P (x)] denotes the Shannon entropy of
distribution density P (x). Through the numerical simula-
tions, the extreme point of qEA and the secret key rate can
be obtained. Figure 1 shows the simulated results of the
secret key rate for both the Gaussian and the binary modu-




1−G for the binary modulation and VA = 40 for the
Gaussian modulation. From Fig. 1, we can see that the
secret key rate of the binary modulation is approximately
41% higher than that of the Gaussian-modulated scheme
and much higher than that of the binary-modulated post-
selection scheme [1].
Under the condition of excess noise [5]: When there
is equivalent excess noise ξN0 on Alice’s side, we have
Vb|a = (1 +Gξ)N0 = G(1 + κ)N0 [3], where κ is an in-
troduced parameter. Then H(B|A) = H0 + 0.5 log2(1 +
Gξ) = H0 + H
′. Under this condition through an en-
tropy estimate Alice and Bob may not find Eve lurking
when H(B|A,E) ≥ H(B|A) − 2H ′ and thus cannot
limit Eve’s attack only to the Markov method. Eve may
replace the noisy line between Alice and Bob with a noise-
less one and then inject an entangled beam to directly at-
tack more of Bob’s information [3]. Then the secret key
rate becomes △I ≥ γ[inf I(A : B|E) − 2H ′]. Here,
Eve’s attacked information can be divided into two parts,
FIG. 1: Compare of the secret key rates of Gaussian-modulated
scheme and that of the binary-modulated scheme, where the
quantum channel attenuation efficiency is 0.2dB/km. The solid
line denotes the secret key rate of the binary-modulated scheme,
the dashed line denotes that of the Gaussian-modulated scheme
and the doted line denotes their ratio.
obtained from the previous Markov chain and from other
non-Markov ways. The information eavesdropped from
the Markov chain can be given by previous Markov anal-
ysis, and the amount of other additional information at-
tacked through non-Markov ways can be limited by the
conditional noise estimate. To attack more additional in-
formation, the utility Eve can employ is the excess noise.
Under the guise of excess noise, Eve may control Al-
ice and Bob’s channel to assist the Markov attack or per-
form the entangling cloner attack [3]. However, the max-
imum noise change caused by Eve’s attack should not
exceed the excess noise. Eve should always maintain∫
P (b|a, e)P (e|a)de = P (b|a) for both quadratures.
Then, no matter what Eve’s non-Markov attack tactic is,
the maximum additional information she can eavesdrop is






2H ′, where ρB(ξ) denotes the possible state, the noise in-
troduced by which on Bob’s side can be indistinguishable
from the excess noise. In the following, we use ∆IMar to
denote the secret key rate guaranteed by the pure Markov
analysis Then, the final minimum secret key rate can be
given by ∆IMar − 2H ′.
Suppose IMar(E : B) and IMar(E : A) are Eve’s
information attacked purely through the Markov chain.
Then, the Holevo bound requires I(A : B) + IMar(A :
E) − IMar(B : E) ≤ χ(ρA), while for the extensive
process it requires I(A : B) + I(A : E) − I(B :
E) + I(B : E|A) ≤ χ(ρA). Generally speaking, the in-
formation attacked through the non-Markov way is no less
than I(B : E|A), which means I(B : E) − IMar(E :
B) ≥ I(B : E|A). However, through a conditional
noise estimate, Alice and Bob can restrain this informa-
tion to I[B : E| ∫ P (b|a, e)P (e|a)de = P (b|a)] =
I(B : E|A). Then we can see that max[I(A : E)] =
max[IMar(A : E)], which means that the non-Markov
method does not help Eve to obtain more information from
4Alice while she has already stolen the maximum informa-
tion through the Markov attack. Thus, we have I(A :
B) + I(A : E)− IMar(B : E) ≤ χ(ρA).
Under the excess noise condition, because of Alice and
Bob’s conditional noise estimate, the channel between Al-
ice and Bob cannot be altered by Eve. Then still only
when HMar(B|e) = HMar(B|E) and HMar(A|e) =
HMar(A|E) can she obtain the maximum information
from Bob through the Markov chain.
For the Gaussian modulation and Gaussian excess noise,
if the channel is Markovian, to maintain H(B|e) =
H(B|E) and H(A|e) = H(A|E), Eve’s attack
should still be Gaussian and then we have H(B|e) =
0.5 log2(GN
′
E + N0 + GξN0) + τ , H(A|e) =
0.5 log2 N
′
E + τ . χ(ρA) = 0.5 log2 V , H(A) =
0.5 log2 VAN0 + τ , H(B) = 0.5 log2[G(VA + ξ) +




through H(B|E) − H(A|E) ≤ HMax, we can ob-
tain N ′E =
(VA+GξVA)N0
V−GVA+GV ξ and NE =
(1+Gξ)N0
1−G+Gξ . Since
max[I(A : E)] = max[IMar(A : E)], the minimum
noise added on Eve’s side is NE − N0 = GN01−G−Gξ , the
same as that given by Ref. [4, 11]. Consequently we
haveVb|e = G[ (V−1)(κ
−1−1)
κ−1+V
+ κ + 1]N0. Therefore,




The final secret key rate becomes:
△I = △IMar − 2H ′γ = 0.5γ log2
V κ−1 + 2V + V κ
(κ−1 + V )(1 + κ)
−γ log2(1 +Gκ− 1 +G)
= 0.5γ log2[G
2(1 + κ)(V −1 + κ)],
and △IMar > 2H ′γ requires ξ < 0.5. We can see that
this result is exactly the same as the one given by Grosshans
et al [3]. For the binary-modulation, the secret key rate
is about 41% of that of the Gaussian-modulated scheme,
so the binary-modulated scheme remains secure only if
ξ < 20.5%, which may be improved through proper post-
selection [6].
Discussion: In the above, we have chosen the Gaussian-
modulated and binary-modulated schemes as examples.
For other modulations, such as high order discrete phase
[5] and average modulations, the secret key rate can be
given in the same way, and the key for Eve to attack the
maximum information is to find the optimized noise type
that makes H(B|e) and H(A|e) constant. In the reverse
reconciliation scheme, since most of the transmitted infor-
mation may be attacked by Eve and only a small part is kept
in secret [12], Alice and Bob can even utilize this insecure
part of information to transmit public massages.
In the reverse reconciliation scheme, the key to guaran-
tee the security is the accurate estimate of the conditional
entropy and noise for both quadratures, which can be eas-
ily achieved by many mathematical estimate methods, such
as normality test. The attacks that may increase the noise,
such as ‘detect and resend’, cannot be used by Eve, while
other attacks that do not increase the noise, e.g. beam split-
ting, is useless for breaking the Markov chain, and thus
cannot change Eve’s disadvantage.
In the direct reconciliation post-selection scheme [1], it
is the receiver who gets the sender’s information, so that
when beyond the 3dB loss the minimum noise on Eve’s
side may be smaller than that on Bob’s side, and conse-
quently, even though Alice and Bob can use post-selection
to put Eve at a disadvantage, the secret key rate will de-
crease sharply with line loss.
Grosshans et al showed the security of the Gaussian-
modulated scheme through ‘virtual entanglement’ [3].
They also showed that the secret key of the Gaussian-
modulated scheme is the highest among the reverse recon-
ciliation schemes [2]. Here, through the Markov analysis
and functional variational calculation, we not only obtain
the same security for the reverse reconciliation scheme,
but also obtain an identical result for the direct reconcili-
ation scheme [4, 11]. Also, this method is general, through
which the secret key rate for many other modulations can
be given.
Conclusion: In this letter we have proved that through
the accurate conditional entropy and noise estimate, non-
Gaussian-modulated reverse reconciliation schemes can be
guaranteed secure. Also, through a generalized protocol
we have shown how to use many convenient modulations
to distribute the secret key. To show Eve’s optimized at-
tack and the minimum secret key rate for general modula-
tion, we employed the Markov analysis and functional vari-
ational calculation, through which exactly the same result
as existing ones can be given for the Gaussian-modulated
scheme. As an example, we have also shown the advantage
of the binary-modulated protocol, whose secret key rate is
much higher than that of the binary-modulated direct rec-
onciliation one.
Acknowledgement: Special thanks are given to X. N.
Ji for valuable discussions on the normality test. Thanks
are also given to H. Pu and L. A. Wu. This work was sup-
ported by the Science Foundation of China under Grant No.
60537020 and No. 60121503, and the Knowledge Innova-
tion Project of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
∗ Electronic address: zhaoyibo@mail.ustc.edu.cn
† Electronic address: zfhan@ustc.edu.cn
[1] R. Namiki, T. Hirano, Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 117901 (2003).
[2] F. Grosshans, N. J. Cerf, Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 047905 (2004).
[3] F. Grosshans, G. VanAssche, J. Wenger, R. Brourl, N. J.
Cerf, P. Grangier, Nature 421, 238 (2003).
[4] F. Grosshans, P. Grangier, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 057902
(2002).
[5] E. Corndorf, G. S. Kanter, C. Liang, P. Kumar, In Quantum
Information and Computation, E. Donkor, A. R. Pirich, H.
E. Brandt, Eds., Proc. SPIE, 5436, 12 (2004).
5[6] Y. B. Zhao, Z. F. Han, J. J. Chen, Y. Z. Gui, G. C. Guo,
arXiv: quant-ph/ 0603068 (2006).
[7] G. VanAssche, J. Cardinal, N. J. Cerf, IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory 50, 394 (2004).
[8] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Cre´peau, U. M. Maurer,
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 41, 1915 (1995).
[9] I. Bialynicki, J. Mycielski, Commun. Math. Phys. 44, 129
(1975).
[10] C. E. Shannon, Bell Syst. Tech. J. 27, 379 (1948).
[11] F. Grosshans, P. Grangier, Phys. Rev. A 64, 010301 (2001).
[12] Y. B. Zhao, Y. Z. Gui, J. J. Chen, Z. F. Han, G. C. Guo,
arXiv: quant-ph/0602019 (2006).
